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Abstract
The problems which are important for the effective functioning of an access control policy
in a large information system (LIS) are selected. The general concept of a local optimization
of a role-based access control (RBAC) model is formulated. The optimization criteria are
proposed. The algorithms of a local optimization of the RBAC model are defined and justified.
The developed algorithms are used in the methods of the solution of the following problems:
the assessment of risks of the leakage of permissions in the RBAC policy, the access control
in the distributed hierarchical systems, the combining of role-based and mandatory access
control models. In the first problem the question of the permissions distribution in the role
hierarchy is researched. The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is applied to creation of the
estimates. The method is based on the hierarchical structure of a role set. The offered technique
can order the permissions according to the value of the risks of their leakage. In the second
problem the algorithm of the distribution of the cryptographic keys in the system with a
hierarchical arrangement of the objects is offered. The cryptography protocols for the practical
use of this algorithm are defined. The conditions of the implementation of the discretionary
and mandatory principles of the access control on the basis of the developed algorithm are
formulated.
Keywords: access control; role hierarchy; local optimization; permissions leakage risks;
analytic hierarchy process; hash function; sequential access.
1 Introduction
The research objective is the development of methods and algorithms of the solution of the
problems which arise in the case of the implementation of an access control policy in a LIS.
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The specifics of the data access arrangement in a LIS are defined. Here are the most significant
factors:
1. The demand of the RBAC mechanisms as the object-oriented decision which is capable
to reduce complexity of the LIS administration [1, 2].
2. The need for the combination of the several access control models in the case of the
continuous functioning of subsystems where these principles of the access control are imple-
mented [3, 4, 5].
Now interest in RBAC is shifted towards the role mining problem [6, 7, 8, 9] and different
”supermodels” [10, 11]. One more direction of scientific activities is development of methods
of RBAC configuration for cloud computing [12, 13].
Based on these factors a set of the problems which are important for the effective work of
a LIS safety subsystem is selected.
1. The creation and the supporting of the RBAC.
(1.1). The deleting the duplicate roles.
(1.2). The taxonomic distribution of permissions.
(1.3). The optimal file representation of a role hierarchy.
(1.4). The assessment of risks of the leakage of permissions.
(2). The access control on the basis of the computable cryptographic keys.
(3). The combining of the different security models in a computer system.
The efficiency of the solution of these problems significantly depends on the structure of the
role hierarchy which is used in the LIS access control policy. The additional properties of the
role hierarchy which are required for the solution of the formulated problems are found: tree-like
hierarchy; leaf hierarchy; RP -reduced hierarchy; transitive-reduced hierarchy (tab. 1) [14, 15].
Table 1: Characteristics of the role hierarchy which are necessary for the solution of some access
control problems
Role hierarchy tree-like leaf RP -reduced transitive-reduced
Number (1.4) (1.1)
of the (2) (1.2) (1.3)
problem (3)
There is a need for development of the conversion methods of the role hierarchy according
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to the specified characteristics. At the same time changes of an access control subsystem must
be transparent for the user: a user is obliged to receive the same permissions before and after
the conversions.
2 Local optimization of the RBAC
The graph-based representation of the RBAC model was formalized for more strict determina-
tion of the possible conversions of the role hierarchy. It is known that RBAC model is defined
by the set of following elements: U , P , R – sets of users, permissions and roles; RP : R→ 2P ,
UR : U → 2R, RR : R → 2R, UP : U → 2P – mappings which define the distribution of
permissions between roles, the authorization of users for roles, the authorization of roles at
each other, the users permissions.
The directed marked graph which has no directed cycles (the role graph) G = (R,E,RP )
is the graphical representation of sets P , R and mappings RP , RR. The arc (ri, rj) exists in
the role graph if and only if rj ∈ RR(ri).
RBAC models are named the equivalent models if the sets of permissions coincide, the sets
of users coincide too, and the user’s permissions mappings are isomorphic in these models.
Required conversions of the RBAC model must consist in the following:
1) to lead the role hierarchy to the required look;
2) to lead to creation of the equivalent RBAC model;
3) to make the minimum changes to the main sets and mappings of the RBAC model.
These conversions are named the local optimization of the RBAC model. By definition the
local optimization comes down to conversions of a role graph.
For further formalization the RP -conversions of a role graph are defined. These conversions
must lead to creation of the equivalent RBAC model. The conversion of a role graph G to a
role graph G∗ is RP -admissible if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) RP (G) ⊆ RP (G∗);
2) ∀ directed path ρ(ri, rj) ∈ G ∃ ”conjugate” directed path ρ(ru, rv) ∈ G
∗: RP (ri) =
RP (ru) ∧ RP (rj) = RP (rv).
The conversion of a role graph G to a role graph G∗ is RP -equivalent if the following
conditions are satisfied:
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1) RP (G) = RP (G∗);
2) the requirement of the existence of the ”conjugate” directed path must be fulfilled both
for an initial role graph and for a resultant role graph.
It is proved that the conversion F of a role graph G to a role graph G∗ is the local opti-
mization of the RBAC model if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) G∗ meets the selected criterion of optimality;
2) F is RP -admissible (or RP -equivalent) conversion;
3) the number of the nodes and/or of the arcs of a role graph did not increase or this increase
is minimum.
Four criteria of the local optimization of a role graph are selected: tree-like role graph, leaf
role graph, RP -reduced role graph and transitive-reduced role graph.
Some propositions and theorems which define and justify the algorithms of the local op-
timization of the RBAC model are proved [14, 15]. These algorithms lead to creation of the
equivalent RBAC model. Four main and four derivative algorithms are received (tab. 2).
Table 2: Algorithms of the local optimization of the RBAC model
Algorism Conversion Features of the optimal role graph
Main algorithms
(I) RP -admissible single, leaf
(II) RP -equivalent RP -reduced
(III) RP -equivalent tree-like
(IV) RP -equivalent transitive-reduced
Derivative algorithms
(Ia) RP -admissible leaf
(I+II) RP -admissible single, taxonomic, leaf, RP -reduced
(III+I) RP -admissible leaf, tree-like
(III+Ia) RP -admissible single, leaf, tree-like
The complexity of the constructed algorithms is a polynomial in the number of roles and
permissions. The algorithms of the local optimization of the RBAC model were used for creation
of the methods of the solution of some access control problems (tab. 1). The results received
for problems (1.4) (2) and (3) follow.
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3 Applications of the algorithms of the local optimiza-
tion
The assessment problem of risks of the leakage of permissions in the RBAC policy is formalized:
probability of leakage of each permissions pi ∈ P must be evaluated. The new algorithm of the
solution of this problem uses AHP and the role graph of the RBAC policy. The tree-like leaf
role hierarchy is necessary for implementation of the offered approach. This type of hierarchy
is provided by algorithm (III+I). The advantages of the developed technique are defined and
justified:
1. The ”model” error of AHP which arises in a consequence of inconsistency of opinions of
experts is removed.
2. The automation of the process of the ordering of the permissions according to the value
of the risks of their leakage is possible.
The problem of the access control in the hierarchical system is defined: the set of the
system’s objects is partially ordered; access control model for this system must be defined [16].
The execution of the following conditions is supposed:
1. The object hierarchy is defined by the digraph G; the order G is n.
2. Each object Oi (i = 1, . . . , n) is encrypted by a secret key ki (an access key); a symmetric
encryption is used.
3. An access to the object Oi is possible if the access key ki is known and the condition of
a sequential access is satisfied. The sequential access consists in the following: if a user wants
to get an access to the object Oi, he must have an access to all objects which form the directed
path from the hierarchy root to the object Oi.
In the local systems this problem can be solved by a security subsystem. In the distributed
system a uniform security subsystem is absent; the access control is reached by means of
algorithms of a distribution of cryptographic keys and an encryption. The new method of
the distribution of the access keys is offered. This method is based on the principle of the
computability of keys [16]. For the implementation of this approach the object hierarchy must
be tree-like. Algorithm (III) provides this requirement.
The new method of the combining of RBAC and mandatory access control (MAC) is offered.
This approach is based on the search of the ”ideal” solution: the access rules must meet
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requirements of the both models and must not contradict each other. The Cartesian product
of the MAC lattice and the ”role” lattice which is generated by the role hierarchy is considered.
Algorithm (III) is involved for the receiving a ”role” lattice.
Further problems (1.4) and (2) will be represented in more detail.
4 The assessment of risks of the leakage of permissions
The heuristic assumptions are formulated:
1. The more the number of permissions of the role is, the more probability of the attack on
this role is.
2. The more the prevalence of the permission in the role hierarchy is, the more the proba-
bility of the leakage of this permission is.
3. The more the distance of the role from the hierarchy root is, the less the probability of
the attack on this role is.
According to algorithm (III+I) of a local optimization of the RBAC model we can assume
that the role graph is the tree-like leaf digraph T .
At the preparatory stage the tree T extends to the tree Tp: to each leaf rl of the tree T the
new nodes are added; the new node contains one permission from the set of permissions RP (rl)
of the leaf rl (fig. 1). The tree of the solution of the AHP is the tree Tp.
Figure 1: The fragment of the extended tree Tp
At the first stage the relative coefficients of all nodes (except a root) of the tree Tp are
calculated. The calculation of the coefficients takes place in the direction from the root to the
leaf. The nodes rs1, . . . , rsk which are subordinated to one node rs from the previous level are
considered. In terms of AHP the selected nodes rs1, . . . , rsk are the alternatives for the criterion
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rs. For each subset {rs1, . . . , rsk} the paired comparisons matrix Ms is built. This matrix is
used for the calculation of the relative coefficients of the nodes rs1, . . . , rsk. The matrix element
[Ms]ij which corresponds to pair (rsi, rsj) is equated to the relation of the number of permissions
of the role ri to the number of permissions of the role rj :
[Ms]ij =
|RP (rsi)|
|RP (rsj)|
.
It is proved that these paired comparisons matrixes are ideally coordinated. As a result the
relative coefficient wsi of the node rsi is calculated according to the formula:
wsi =
|RP (rsi)|∑k
j=1 |RP (rsj)|
.
At the second stage the combined coefficients (probabilities or risks of the leakage of per-
missions) are calculated. The probability of the leakage of the permission p is equal to the sum
over all directed paths from the root to the leaves which contain this permission. Each item of
the sum is the product of the relative coefficients of the nodes which form one of the directed
paths.
P (p) =
∑
ρ(root, leaf): RP (leaf)={p}

 ∏
j: rj∈ρ(root, leaf)
wj

 .
The complexity of the suggested algorithm is a polynomial in the number of roles n and
permissions m: T = O((n×m)2).
5 The access control on the basis of the computable
cryptographic keys
One secret key k0 is determined and stored. All access keys are calculated one of another
according to an object hierarchy: if an arc (Oi, Oj) is in the hierarchy then the access key kj of
the object Oj is a value of the function h, which is infeasible to invert (h is one-way function).
The function h depends on the access key ki of the object Oi and the properties of the object
Oj: kj = h(ki, Oj). The algorithm of the formation of computable access keys for a tree-like
object hierarchy is defined. This algorithm uses cryptographic hash function as function h.
1. The unique identifier idi is assigned to each object Oi. The general initialized key k0 is
defined.
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2. The access key k1 of the object O1 which is a root of the object hierarchy is calculated by
the formula: k1 = h(k0 ◦ id1), where (k0 ◦ id1) is the concatenation of the key and the identifier.
3. For each arc (Oi, Oj) of the object hierarchy the access key kj of the object Oj is calculated
by the formula:
kj = h(ki ◦ idj).
The suggested algorithm is named ”hash-based access keys distribution” (HBAKD). It is
proved that existence of the tree-like object hierarchy is necessary and sufficient condition
of uniqueness of the computation of access keys according to the HBAKD algorithm. The
generalized algorithm of the formation of computable access keys for arbitrary object hierarchy
which is described by the digraph G is defined:
1. The directed tree T which is ID-equivalent to the digraph G is constructed. For this
purpose the modification of algorithm (III) of a local optimization of the RBAC model is used.
2. According to the HBAKD algorithm the access keys for all nodes of the tree T are
computed.
3. Secret sharing scheme can be applied to each ID class of the tree T if this class consists
of several elements.
The cryptographic protocols for the practical use of the HBAKD algorithm are offered.
The main one is ”Key-change” protocol (fig. 2). The possible attacks on these protocols are
analyzed. The additional safety measures which are put in protocols are proved (tab. 3).
Figure 2: The scheme of ”Key-change” protocol
Table 3: The additional safety measures of the ”key-change” protocol
Possible attacks Safety measures
Interception of the message ”Key-change”; substitution of the ”child” Step 2
Sending the false message ”Key-change”; substitution of the ”parent” of the protocol
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The conditions of the implementation of the discretionary and mandatory principles of the
access control on the basis of the HBAKD algorithm are formulated. It is supposed that the
set of the objects is partially ordered and the access to any object is possible only sequentially
from the ”parent” object to the ”child” object. It is proved that the implementation of the
mandatory and discretionary models of the access control is possible for a tree-like object
hierarchy in the case of the execution of the conditions which are listed in table 4 (IDS is the
set of the identifiers of the objects which are accessible for the subject S).
Table 4: Conditions of the implementation of the discretionary and mandatory principles of
the access control
Access control Identifiers It is known to the S
Mandatory Open ki
Discretionary Secret k0 + IDS
Mandatory and discretionary Secret ki + IDS
6 Conclusions
Some problems which are important for the effective work of an access control policy in a LIS
have been discussed. The solution of these problems significantly depended on the structure of
the hierarchy of the system’s entities. A special attention has been paid to the RBAC model.
The general concept of the local optimization of the RBAC model has been formulated. This
process consists in the equivalent conversions of a role graph. The equivalent conversions make
the minimum changes to the main sets and mappings of the RBAC model and increase the
efficiency of the functioning of the system due to the coercion of the role hierarchy to the
required look. The tools which can execute the specified conversions of the RBAC model have
been developed. On the basis of optimization algorithms the methods of the creation and of
the supporting of the access control policy in a LIS have been obtained. The correctness of the
offered approaches, methods and algorithms has been confirmed by the rigorous mathematical
proofs and by the results of the computing experiments.
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